| 摘要: |
| 公立医院逐利在微观层面的实现依托医生，因此通过约束医生不合理的医疗行为可以进一步限制公立医院的逐利行为。研究不完全信息下医生与患者之间的博弈关系，并基于委托代理理论设计医生行为的激励合同。进而返回到宏观层面，多主体合作构建公立医院多元外部监管体系。 |
| 关键词: 公立医院 外部监管 激励合同 不完全信息 |
| DOI： |
|
| 基金项目: |
|
| Study on Multielement External Supervision System of Public Hospitals Under Incomplete Information |
|
| () |
| Abstract: |
| In the micro level，excessive medical treatment is the way to achieve the goal of public hospitals’ benefit maximization. Therefore，restricting the doctor’s unreasonable medical behavior can further limit the behavior of the public hospitals. The paper studies the relationship between doctors and patients under incomplete information，and designs the incentive contract based on the Principal-agent Theory. And to the macro level，the paper builds an external supervision system based on multi agent cooperation. |
| Key words: public hospital,external supervision,incentive contract,incomplete information |
